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I. INTRODUCTION
The employment discrimination laws in Nebraska have created
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.A., Northland College,
1974; M.S., J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1976. I would like to thank Timothy
Loudon and George Green for their assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. This is the second part of a two part Article. Part one appears at 62 NEB. L.
REV. 225 (1983).
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a 1rocedural labyrinth.2 Federal,3 state,4 and local5 antidiscrimina-
tion laws provide a variety of procedural routes to attack the Mino-
taur of discrimination, but the routes are intricately intertwined
and have many blind alleys. This is the second part of an Article
that explores the labyrinth. Part one described the procedural pro-
visions of the state and local fair employment practices laws in Ne-
braska and discussed the interrelationship of those laws.6 This
part explores another corridor of the labyrinth. It first describes
the procedural provisions of Title VII;7 then it discusses the inter-
relationship of Title VII with the state and local antidiscrimination
laws in Nebraska.8 Finally, the Article concludes by considering
2. When the Minotaur [a monster who was half bull and half human]
was born Minos did not kill him. He had Daedalus, a great architect
and inventor, construct a place of confinement for him from which
escape was impossible. Daedalus built the Labyrinth, famous
throughout the world. Once inside, one would go endlessly along its
twisting paths without ever finding the exit .... There was no possi-
ble way to escape.
E. HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 151 (1942). See Willborn, Employment Discrimina-
tion Laws in Nebraska: A Procedural Labyrinth (pt. 1), 62 NEB. L. REV. 225,
228 & n.21 (1983).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) [herein-
after referred to as Title VII]. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 226 n.5.
4. Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 48-1126
(1978 and Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Nebraska FEPA].
5. OAiA, NEB., MUN. CODE, §§ 13-81 to 13-98, 13-116 to 13-222 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as Omaha FEPO]; LiNcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE, §§ 11.01.010 to
11.01.070, 11.08.010 to 11.08.180 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Lincoln
FEPO]; GRAND ISLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE, §§ 37-1 to 37-4, 37-7 to 37-23 (1980)
[hereinafter referred to as Grand Island FEPO].
6. See Willborn, supra note 2.
7. Title VII, §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
8. This Article will focus on the private enforcement procedures of Title VII and
the state and local fair employment practices laws. Title VII also provides
procedures for public enforcement of the Act. The federal Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Attorney General may ifie
actions in federal district court to enforce Title VII. Title VII, §§ 706(f), 707,42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 2000e-6 (1976); President Carter's Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1978,43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978). The Lincoln FEPO provides a similar
type of public enforcement. LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE §§ 11.01.030(a),
11.01.040(b) (1980). See Willborn, supra note 2, at 232 n.46, 240 nn.108-109.
When the government acts to enforce antidiscrimination mandates, it does
not serve "merely [as] a proxy for the victims of discrimination." General
Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980). Rather, the government acts "for
the benefit of specific individuals, [but] also to vindicate the public interest in
preventing employment discrimination." Id. Compare GRAND ISLAND, NEB.,
MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981) (a court action may be brought by the local admin-
istrative agency "on behalf of the complainant"); OmAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE
§§ 13-157, 13-159 (1980). In addition, Title VII provides special procedures for
federal employees with discrimination claims. Title VII, § 717, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 (1976). This Article will not discuss in detail public enforcement
procedures or the special procedures of Title VII for federal employees.
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procedural strategy in employment discrimination cases in
Nebraska.
II. TITLE VII PROCEDURES
"Title VII is the core of employment discrimination law."9 It is
the most comprehensive of the federal laws prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination10 and has had a hegemonic effect on the for-
mation and interpretation of state and local antidiscrimination
laws." This section will describe the procedural provisions of Title
VII. The focus will be on the relationship of Title VII to Nebraska's
state and local fair employment practices laws.12
A. Coverage 13
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination because of a per-
son's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.14 Every state and
local fair employment practices law in Nebraska contains broader
9. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 214
(1980).
10. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (9176); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
774 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See generally C.
ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND MATERIALS 442 (1980).
11. Title VII, for example, was used as a model when the Nebraska FEPA was
drafted. See, e.g., Floor Debate on L.B. 656, at 1970 (June 14, 1965) (statement
of Sen. Danner) ("the language in this bill . .. is taken from the national
guidelines of [Title VIII"); id. at 1972 (statement of Sen. Kjar) ("the commit-
tee tried to keep [the bill in] conformity with [Title VIII just as nearly as
possible"); id. at 1972-74, 1976, 1980, 1982-83 (statements of Sen. Danner) (sev-
eral sections of the Nebraska FEPA are taken from Title VII). In addition,
the Nebraska FEPA has been interpreted to conform to Title VII. See, e.g.,
Duffy v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 233, 237, 214 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1976).
See also Sullivan & Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two
Steps Forward, One Step Back?, 27 S.C.L. REV. 1, 8 (1975) (interpretation of
Title VII should guide interpretation of the South Carolina Human Affairs
Law).
12. This Article will not be, and does not purport to be, an exhaustive study of
procedural issues under Title VII. The Article has a narrower focus and, in
any event, exhaustive studies of Title VII procedures have already been
made. See 2 A. LARSON & L LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION chs. 9A-11
(1982) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRnINATION LAw 933-1531 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI]; C.
SUUIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION chs. 3-7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL STATU-
TORY LAw].
13. This Article focuses on the relationship between Title VII and the state and
local antidiscrimination laws in Nebraska. Consequently, it will not consider
a host of coverage issues that might arise under Title VII. See Willborn,
supra note 2, at 231 n.39.
14. Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
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prohibitions than Title VII.'5
The prohibitions of Title VII apply to employers,16 labor organi-
zations,17 and employment agencies.18 Employers are defined in
Title VII as persons having fifteen or more employees.19 Thus, Ti-
tle VII reaches basically the same employers covered by the Ne-
braska Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA);20 the local
ordinances in Nebraska reach smaller employers than do Title VII
and the Nebraska FEPA.21 Title VII covers basically the same la-
bor organizations 22 and employment agencies 23 as the Nebraska
FEPA and the local ordinances.
B. The Charge 24
The Title VII procedure begins, as do all of the antidiscrimina-
tion procedures in Nebraska, 25 with the filing of a charge. 26 The
15. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 230.
16. Title VII, §§ 703(a), (d), 704(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (d), 2000e-3(a),
(b) (1976).
17. Title VII, §§ 703(c), (d), 704(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(c),(d), 2000e-3(a), (b)
(1976).
18. Title VII, §§ 703(b), 704(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b), 2000e-3(a), (b) (1976).
19. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such a person ... " Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1976).
20. The Nebraska FEPA also defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an in-
dustry who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year. . . ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982). The Nebraska
FEPA definition, however, is broader than the Title VII definition. Title VII's
definition is restricted to industries "affecting commerce," while the Ne-
braska FEPA definition is not. See EEOC Decisions, No. 71-351 (Oct. 13,
1970); EEOC Decisions, No. 71-359 (Oct. 22, 1970); EEOC Decisions, No. 71-
2240 (May 25, 1971). In addition, the Nebraska FEPA, but not Title VII, covers
the State of Nebraska, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions "re-
gardiess of the number of employees." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102 (Cum. Supp.
1982).
21. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 231 & nn.41-42.
22. Compare Title VII, § 701(d)-(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(d)-(e) (1976) with NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-1102(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUiN. CODE § 13-
88(e) (1980); LINcOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.010(1) (1980); and GRAND Is-
LANm, NEB., Mur. CODE § 37-3(j) (1981).
23. Compare Title VII, § 701(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1976) with NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 48-1102(4) (Cum. Supp. 1982); OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-88(D) (1980);
LincoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.01.010(i) (1980); and GRAND IsLAND, NEB.,
MUN. CODE § 37-3(k) (1981).
24. There are a multitude of timeliness issues that are outside the scope of this
Article. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 232 n.47.
25. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 231 & n.44.
26. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
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charge may be ified with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) by an aggrieved person, by any person on
behalf of an aggrieved person,27 or by an EEOC Commissioner.28
To qualify as a charge, a statement need only "identify the parties
and . . . describe generally the action or practices complained
of."29
In Nebraska,30 a charge must be filed with a state or local
agency before it can be filed with the EEOC.31 The EEOC fling
cannot occur until 60 days after the state or local filing or until the
state or local agency terminates its proceedings. 32 The charge
must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged dis-
criminatory act or within 30 days of the time the state or local
agency terminates its proceedings, whichever is earlier.3 3
A charging party, then, must file a charge with a state or local
agency within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory act to be as-
sured of preserving her Title VII cause of action. If a charging
party fies with a state or local agency 241 days after the alleged
discriminatory act and the agency does not terminate its proceed-
27. Id. See EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (1982).
28. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See EEOC Procedural Regu-
lations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1982).
29. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1982). See Title VII,
§ 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1982). See generally FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 12,
§ 3.3, at 270; LARSON, supra note 12, at § 48.40.
30. Nebraska is a "deferral" state because it has state and local laws prohibiting
unlawful employment practices and state and local agencies with the author-
ity to grant relief from such practices. Title VIL § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(c) (1976). In a nondeferral state, a charging party must file a charge with
the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Title VII,
§ 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
31. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976)'. The Supreme Court has ap-
proved a dual filing procedure which allows a charging party to complete the
filing requirement by filing a charge with the EEOC only. Upon receipt of the
charge, the EEOC forwards it to a state or local agency and formally fies the
charge after 60 days have passed or after the EEOC receives notification that
the state or local agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever occurs
first. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). See EEOC Procedural Regula-
tions, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (1982). The EEOC has sanctioned a similar dual
filing procedure when the charge is initially filed with a state or local agency.
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b) (1982).
32. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). The 60-day deferral period is
extended to 120 days during the first year after the effective date of an appli-
cable state or local law. Id.
33. Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). Theoretically, the time limit
for filing a charge with the EEOC could expire as soon as 30 days after the
alleged discriminatory act. If the charging party ifies a charge with a state or
local agency on the day the alleged discriminatory act occurs and the agency
immediately terminates its proceedings, a charge must be filed with the
EEOC within 30 days to be timely. Id.
[Vol. 62:708
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ings in less than 60 days, the charging party cannot file with the
EEOC until 301 days after the alleged discriminatory act.34 That is
too late.35 On the other hand, a charging party may be able to pre-
serve her Title VII cause of action if she fies a charge as late as 300
days after the alleged discriminatory act. The charging party must
initially fie with a state or local agency, but if the state or local
agency immediately terminates its proceedings,36 a charge filed
immediately thereafter with the EEOC would be timely.
3 7
34. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (a charge cannot be ified with
the EEOC until 60 days after filing with the state or local agency).
35. Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807 (1980).
36. The state or local agency may immediately terminate its proceedings because
the charge is untimely under state or local law. See NEB. Rmv. STAT. § 48-
1118(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (180-day time limit for filing charge under Ne-
braska FEPA); OmAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-135 (1980) (180-day time limit
for filing charge under Omaha FEPO); LINCOLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.060
(1980) (180-day time limit for filing charge under Lincoln FEPO); GRAND IS-
LAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-10(c) (1981) (180-day time limit for filing charge
under Grand Island FEPO). The state or local charge need not be timely in
order to preserve the 300-day time limit for filing with the EEOC in a deferral
state. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 816 n.19 (1980). See FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAw, supra note 12, §§ 3.6(d) (2)-(3), at 290-96.
A riskier approach to this issue is sanctioned by the EEOC's procedural
guidelines. The EEOC does not require a charging party to file a charge with
a state or local agency if the state or local charge is "apparently untimely."
Instead, the EEOC will formally fie the charge upon receipt and treat it as
timely if it is received within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.
EEOC Procedural Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a) (3) (1982). This approach
is riskier than the approach suggested above because the 300-day time limit is
an exception to the 180-day time limit in nondeferral states and, technically,
the exception is only available if the charging party has "initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency." Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1976). Thus, a respondent could argue that the EEOC filing is
untimely because the 300-day exception to the normal 180-day time limit does
not apply.
Until recently, charging parties before the NEOC had to follow the EEOC
approach, despite its riskiness. The NEOC refused to accept untimely
charges; it would not allow charging parties to file them. Consequently, a
charging party could not institute state proceedings that would terminate
quicky because of untimeliness. But see Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(c) (1976) ("If any requirement for the commencement of [state and local]
proceedings is imposed.., other than a requirement of the filing of a written
and signed statement of the facts . . ., the proceeding shall be deemed to
have been commenced ... at the time such statement is sent by registered
mail to the appropriate State or local authority."). The NEOC has wisely dis-
continued its practice of refusing to accept untimely charges. NEOC Memo-
randum (February 23,1983) (on ifie with Nebraska Law Review). The NEOC
should further assist charging parties in preserving Title VII claims by imme-
diately terminating its proceedings upon receipt of an untimely charge.
37. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (a charge may be filed with
the EEOC upon the termination of state or local proceedings).
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
C. The EEOC Administrative Process
Upon receipt of a charge, the EEOC notifies the respondent3 8
and begins an investigation.3 9 As a result of the investigation, the
EEOC decides whether to: (1) dismiss the charge, (2) make a de-
termination that there is no reasonable cause to believe Title VII
has been violated, or (3) make a determination of reasonable cause
to believe Title VII has been violated.
The EEOC may decide to dismiss the charge for a number of
reasons.40 The EEOC may dismiss a charge, for example, if the
charge was not timely filed4' or if the charging party fails to coop-
erate with the EEOC42 or cannot be located.43 The EEOC may
even dismiss a charge if the charging party fails to accept a reason-
able settlement offer.44 An EEOC dismissal, though, is accompa-
nied by a right-to-sue letter.45 The right-to-sue letter authorizes the
charging party to file a Title VII lawsuit and, hence, obtain a de
novo review of her claim in federal court. 6
If the EEOC does not dismiss the charge, it will make a reason-
able cause determination.47 If the EEOC determines that there is
38. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The notice must be served
on the respondent within ten (10) days of the filing of the charge. Id. The
right of a charging party to file a private lawsuit under Title VII is not
prejudiced by the failure of the EEOC to provide timely notice to the respon-
dent. See 118 CONG. REC. 7167 (1972) ("lilt is not intended. . . that failure to
give notice of the charge to the respondent within 10 days would prejudice
the rights of the [charging party] "); see also Heath v. D.H. Baldwin Co., 447 F.
Supp. 495, 501-02 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Fesel v. Masonic Home, 428 F. Supp. 573,
576 (D. Del. 1977); McAdams v. Thermal Indus., 428 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (W.D.
Pa. 1977).
39. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). EEOC regulations contem-
plate charge dismissals before investigation where the charge appears un-
meritorious on its face or as amplified by the statements of the charging
party. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1982).
40. See EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1982). See also [1982]
EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) §§ 4.1 to 4.9.
41. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1982). See Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 413 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(c) (1982).
43. Id. at § 1601.19(d).
44. Id. at § 1601.19(e). The EEOC Compliance Manual indicates that dismissal
for failure to accept a settlement offer should be used only in "extraordinary
circumstances" where the "charging party's demands are excessive and the
charging party is defiant of the Commission and respondent's effort to reach a
settlement." [1982] EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 4.9(a).
45. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19(f), 1601.28(b) (3) (1982).
46. Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). See, e.g., Stebbins v. Conti-
nental Ins. Cos., 442 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cox v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1969). See infra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text.
47. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). A settlement, of course, can
occur at any time during the administrative process. Discussion of settle-
[Vol. 62:708
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not reasonable cause to believe Title VII has been violated, it will
dismiss the charge. 8 Once again,4 9 the EEOC will issue a right-to-
sue letter when it dismisses the charge.SO As a result, the charging
party may obtain a de novo review of her charge.
If the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve Title VII has been violated, it will attempt to conciliate the
matter.5 ' Conciliation is a specialized form of settlement negotia-
tion.52 It is different from ordinary settlement negotiations be-
cause the government is a party.53 Since a third party is involved,
conciliation can fail even where the charging party and respondent
settle their dispute,5 4 and conciliation can be successful even in
the absence of a settlement between the charging party and the
respondent.S If the EEOC, respondent, and charging party exe-
cute a conciliation agreement, the case is at an end. The concilia-
tion agreement is an enforceable contract.56 If the charging party
does not enter into a conciliation agreement, the EEOC will issue a
ments, however, will be reserved until later. See infra notes 51-58 and accom-
panying text.
48. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) (1982).
49. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
50. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19(f), 1601.28(b) (3) (1982).
51. Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(b) (1976); EEOC Procedural Regula-
tions, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1982).
52. Conciliation under the state and local procedures is also a specialized form of
settlement negotiation. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 237-38.
53. "Ordinary" settlements between the parties can occur at any time. The par-
ties may resolve their dispute before the aggrieved party files a charge. After
the filing of a charge but before a reasonable cause determination, the EEOC
may encourage settlements between the parties by agreeing to discontinue
the processing of a charge or consenting to the withdrawal of a charge.
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.10, 1601.20 (1982). The par-
ties may also settle after a reasonable cause determination. See infra note 56
and accompanying text. Private settlements after commencement of the
EEOC administrative process, however, entail risks for respondents. The
EEOC may file an action against the respondent based either on the charging
party's charge, Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976) or, if that
charge has been prejudiced or withdrawn, on a Commissioner's charge.
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20(a) (1982). See supra note
8.
54. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 237 & nn. 75-76.
55. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.24(c), 1601.28(b) (2) (1982).
See [1982] EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 63.
56. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.
Mississippi Baptist Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 411, 412-14 (S.D.
Miss. 1976); [1982] EEOC CompL. MAN. (BNA) § 80 (1982). But see EEOC v.
Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (EEOC cannot enforce
a pre-determination settlement agreement). See generally FEDERAL STATU-
TORY LAw, supra note 12, § 14.2, at 846-47.
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right-to-sue letter5 7 and the charging party may file a lawsuit.5 8
In summary, the EEOC administrative process requires the is-
suance of a right-to-sue letter5 9 in the following situations: (1) af-
ter the dismissal of a charge,60 (2) after a determination of no
reasonable cause,6 1 or (3) after a determination of reasonable
cause and the failure of conciliation.62 In addition, a charging
party may request a right-to-sue letter prior to completion of the
administrative process. The EEOC will issue a right-to-sue letter
upon request 180 days after the filing of the charge 63 and may issue
a right-to-sue letter upon request prior to 180 days after the filing of
the charge if the EEOC administrative process cannot be com-
pleted promptly.64
D. Federal Court Litigation
The charging party must fie an action in court within 90 days of
receiving a right-to-sue letter.65 The lawsuit, usually in federal
court,66 is not constrained by the EEOC processes, 67 but rather is a
de novo hearing of the charging party's claim.68 The EEOC investi-
57. Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976); EEOC Procedural Guidelines,
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.28(b) (1) & (2) (1982).
58. The process could also culminate in a lawsuit by the government on behalf of
a charging party. Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). See General
Electric Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980). Cf. Title VII, § 707, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976) (the government may also enforce Title VII in the ab-
sence of a charge). Government lawsuits to enforce Title VII, however, are
outside the scope of this article. See supra note 8.
59. The EEOC need not issue a right-to-sue letter if it brings an action based on
the charge of a charging party. Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
See General Electric Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980). The charging
party, however, has a right to intervene in the EEOC suit. Id. See generally
FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 12, at §§ 7.2-.3.
60. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
63. EEOC Procedural Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1) (1982).
64. EEOC Procedural Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (2) (1982).
65. Title VII, § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (timely filing of court action is a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to a Title VII action).
66. Title VII confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hear Title VII claims. Title
VII, § 706(f) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (1976). The Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly reserved judgment on whether this is an exclusive grant of jurisdic-
tion or whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear Title VII
claims. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1982). See
infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text.
67. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 798-99 ("[W] e will not engraft
on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review of claims of em-
ployment discrimination in the federal courts.").
68. "[C]ourt actions under Title VII are de novo proceedings .... " Id. at 799
(quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971)). See
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gates and conciliates, but the federal courts retain the primary
fact-finding and enforcement responsibilities under Title VII;69 an
adverse determination by the EEOC does not prejudice a charging
party's rights in court.70
There are only two prerequisites to court action: (1) the timely
filing of a charge with the EEOC, and (2) the timely filing of a court
action upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter.7 1 Most other proce-
dural issues at this stage are governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 72
Ill. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL WITH STATE AND
LOCAL PROCEDURES
A. Administrative Coordination
A charging party in Nebraska may be able to file her charge
with as many as three agencies. In Omaha, Lincoln, or Grand Is-
land, a charge may be filed with the federal, state, or local enforce-
ment agency.73 In other parts of Nebraska, a charge may be fied
with the EEOC or the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission
(NEOC). This section will discuss the administrative coordination
between the EEOC and state and local agencies.
A charge must be filed with a state or local agency before it can
formally be ified with the EEOC.74 A charging party may, how-
ever, initially ifie her charge with the EEOC.75 The EEOC will
hold the charge in "suspended animation"76 and defer the charge
also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976); Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1974).
69. Title VII, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). Compare Willborn, supra note 2, at
238-43 (adversarial hearings take place before administrative hearing officers
under the Nebraska FEPA and Omaha FEPO and before the Lincoln Com-
mission under the Lincoln FEPO).
70. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
71. Id. See generally FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 12, at § 3.2.
72. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (class action issues
governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania, 530 F.2d 501,
504-05 (3d Cir. 1976) (intervention issues resolved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24);
Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1974) (per-
missive joinder issues resolved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20); LeBeau v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1973) (necessary parties issues
resolved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19). See generally LARsON, supra note 12, at
§ 49.
73. See infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
74. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
75. The EEOC has no offices in Nebraska. As a result, few charges are filed ini-
tially with the EEOC. Rather, charges are filed with the EEOC's agents
within the state-the NEOC, Omaha Commission and Lincoln Commission.
See infra notes 77 & 83-87 and accompanying text.
76. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972). See upra note 31.
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to a qualified 77 state or local agency. 78 The EEOC will then com-
mence its proceedings at the time a charge could formally be fied
with the EEOC.79 The EEOC defers charges arising in areas of
Nebraska other than Omaha and Lincoln to the only qualified state
or local agency-the NEOC. For charges arising in Omaha and
Lincoln,8 0 there are two qualified state or local agencies to which
the EEOC could defer-the NEOC and the local commission. Ex-
cept for charges ified within the jurisdiction of the Omaha Com-
mission,81 the EEOC defers charges initially filed with the EEOC
to the NEOC. Charges within the jurisdiction of the Omaha Com-
mission are deferred to the Omaha Commission.8 2
Rather than filing a charge with the EEOC, a charging party
may initially fie her charge with a state or local agency. The
NEOC, Omaha Commission, and Lincoln Commission are 706
agencies; 83 as a result, if the charging party requests that the
charge be fied with the EEOC as well as the local agency, 84 the
77. The EEOC must defer to a state or local agency when there is "a State or
local law [1] prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and
[2] establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief
from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings." Title VII, § 706(c), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). State or local agencies which satisfy these require-
ments may be designated by the EEOC as "706 Agencies." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70
(1982). The NEOC and Omaha Commission are 706 Agencies for all Title VII
charges, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) (1982), and the Lincoln Commission is a 706
Agency for most Title VII charges. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) & n.8 (1982) (the
Lincoln Commission is a 706 Agency for all charges except a charge by an
"applicant for membership" alleging a violation of Section 703(c) (2) of Title
VII and charges alleging that a "joint labor-management committee" has vio-
lated Section 704(a) or 704(b) of Title VII). The Grand Island Commission is
not a 706 Agency.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)-(5) (1982).
79. The EEOC will formally file the charge 60 days after deferral to the state or
local agency, upon termination of the state or local proceedings, or upon
waiver of the state or local agency's right to exclusively process the charge,
whichever is earliest. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (5) (ii) (1982).
80. The EEOC defers charges arising in Grand Island to the NEOC. Workshar-
ing Agreement Between Nebraska Equal Opportunity Comm'n and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, I1 (1982) (on file with Nebraska
Law Review) [hereinafter NEOC Worksharing Agreement]. The Grand Is-
land Commission is not a 706 Agency, see supra note 77, and does not have a
worksharing agreement with the EEOC. See infra notes 88-95 and accompa-
nying text.
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(d) (1982); NEOC Worksharing Agreement, supra note
80 at III; Letter from Walden Silva, EEOC District Director, to Lawrence
Myers, NEOC Executive Director (July 8, 1982) (on ifie with Nebraska Law
Review).
82. Worksharing Agreement between Omaha Human Relations Dept. and Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 6 (1982) (on fie with Nebraska Law Re-
view) [hereinafter Omaha Comm'n Worksharing Agreement].
83. See supra note 77.
84. In contrast to charge-filing under Title VII, a charging party need not fie with
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charge will be deemed filed with the EEOC 60 days after the state
or local filing, upon termination of the state or local proceedings, or
upon waiver of the state or local agency's right to exclusively pro-
cess the charge, whichever is earliest.85 As a practical matter, a
charging party in Omaha or Lincoln can choose the agency in
which the charge is initially processed. If she files the charge with
the Omaha or Lincoln8 6 Commission, the local rather than the
state agency will initially process the charge; if she files the charge
with the NEOC,87 the state agency will initially process the charge.
A charge filed initially with the Grand Island Commission
presents special problems. The Grand Island Commission meets
the requirements of Title VII to be a deferral agency;88 however, it
the EEOC to perfect a charge under a state or local law. Consequently, if the
charging party prefers to avoid the EEOC process, she can easily do so by
simply refusing to file a charge with the EEOC. See infra note 199 and accom-
panying text.
85. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b) (1) (1982). See Title VII,
§ 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
86. If a charging party files a charge with the Lincoln Commission and requests
that the charge be presented to the EEOC, the Commission notifies the
EEOC. The EEOC, pursuant to its worksharing agreement with the NEOC,
notifies the NEOC of the charge. NEOC Worksharing Agreement, supra note
80, at II. Thus, both the Lincoln Commission and the NEOC hold a copy of
the charge. By informal agreement, the agency initially receiving the
charge-in this case the Lincoln Commission-generally processes it.
87. If the charging party initially files the charge with the NEOC in Omaha and
requests that the charge be presented to the EEOC, the NEOC will notify the
EEOC. NEOC Worksharing Agreement, supra note 80, at IL The EEOC,
pursuant to its worksharing agreement with the Omaha Commission, notifies
the Omaha Commission of the charge. Omaha Com'n Worksharing Agree-
ment, supra note 82, at 3. By informal agreement, the agency initially re-
ceiving the charge-in this case the NEOC-generally processes it.
The Lincoln Commission does not have a worksharing agreement with the
EEOC, although one is currently being negotiated. Telephone conversation
with Gerald E. Henderson, Executive Director of the Lincoln Comm'n (Sep-
tember 17, 1982). As a result, if a charge is filed with the NEOC in Lincoln
with a request that the charge be presented to the EEOC, the EEOC does not
defer the charge to the Lincoln Commission. The NEOC, then, is the only
state or local agency holding the charge and it will initially process it.
88. A local agency qualifies as a deferral agency when there is: (1) a local law
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged, and (2) the local
agency is authorized to grant or seek relief from such practices or to institute
criminal proceedings. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13(a)(4)(ii), 1601.70(a)
(1982). Cf. St. Aubin v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 972, 974 (D. Neb.
1976) (a state or local agency may qualify as a deferral agency under Section
706(c) even if it is not designated a 706 Agency by the EEOC). The Grand
Island Commission meets these requirements for most charges. See
Willborn, supra note 2, at 227 n.ll (the Grand Island FEPO generally mirrors
Title VII, but does not regulate discriminatory apprenticeship or training
programs).
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is not a 706 Agency89 and does not have a worksharing agreement
with the EEOC.90 A charge filed with the Grand Island Commis-
sion is initially processed by the Commission.9 1 The filing satisfies
the state or local filing requirement of Title V]1.92 The charge,
though, will not automatically be fied with the EEOC upon re-
quest.93 Rather, the charging party must physically file94 the
charge with the EEOC to preserve her federal cause of action.95
B. Issue and Claim Preclusion 96
Title VII clearly contemplates multiple forums to remedy em-
ployment discrimination. 97 The Act requires deferral to an avail-
able state or local antidiscrimination agency 98 before the federal
administrative and judicial processes can be commenced. Thus,
there may be a determination by a state or local tribunal before the
Title VII claim has been resolved. On the other hand, because the
required deferral period is quite short,99 there may be a Title VII
determination before the state or local claim has been resolved.
The Act is not clear on the effect of a state or local determination
on a charging party's Title VII claim, or vice versa.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation.10 O In Kremer, the
charging party filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC deferred
the charge to a state antidiscrimination agency. The state agency
89. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (]982). See supra note 77.
90. Telephone conversation with William J. Sheffler, Grand Island Assistant City
Attorney (April 26, 1983).
91. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 231-44.
92. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
93. Compare supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
94. The charge may be fied with the EEOC in person or by mail. EEOC Proce-
dural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8 (1982).
95. Alternatively, the charging party could preserve her federal cause of action
by filing her charge with the NEOC and requesting that the charge be
presented to the EEOC. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.13(b) (1982). See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. This route,
however, may lead to timeliness problems because it could be argued that the
charge cannot formally be filed with the EEOC until a period of time after the
NEOC filing. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b) (1) (1982).
96. For definitions of these terms, see Willborn, supra note 2, at 246-47 & nn.158-
60.
97. For the purposes of multiple forums in combatting employment discrimina-
tion, see Willborn, supra note 2, at 252-55.
98. Where there are state and local antidiscrimination agencies, Title VII re-
quires only that the charging party initially fie under the State or local law,
not both. Title VI, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(c) (1976).
99. The required deferral period is sixty days. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (1976).
100. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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investigated the charge and concluded there was no probable
cause to believe that discrimination had taken place.ir' The state
agency's decision was then upheld by an administrative appeals
board1 02 and a state court.103 The charging party then filed a Title
VII action in federal district court.lO4 The Supreme Court held that
the prior state court determination precluded federal court consid-
eration of the Title VII claim.10 5
In Kremer, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the
preclusive effect to be accorded (1) state or local administrative
proceedings and (2) state judicial proceedings. The Court stated,
in dicta, that state or local administrative proceedings should not
be given preclusive effect in subsequent Title VII proceedings. 0 6
Section 706(b) of Title VH1107 requires the EEOC to give "substan-
tial weight," but not preclusive effect, to state and local administra-
tive determinations. To avoid the anomaly of binding the federal
courts to determinations that do not bind the EEOC, the Court
stated that the courts are similarly not precluded by state and local
administrative determinations. 08
In Nebraska, then, reasonable cause determinations by state
and local agencies' 09 do not preclude subsequent federal or
state" 0 review. In addition, decisions made by state and local
agencies after a hearing"' do not preclude subsequent federal re-
101. Id. at 464. The charging party, who was not represented by counsel at this
time, did not request the informal hearing to which he was entitled. As a
result, the probable cause determination was made without a hearing. Id. at
485. For a more complete recitation of the facts, see Note, Res Judicata, Col-
lateral Estoppel and Title VII: Tool or Trap for the Unwary, 62 NEB. L. REV.
384 (1983).
102. The administrative appeals board held that the state agency's determination
was "not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 456 U.S. at 464.
103. The state court held that the state agency's determination was not "'arbi-
trary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwar-
ranted exercise of discretion,"' that is, that it was not "devoid of a rational
basis." Id. at 490-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. 456 U.S. at 465.
105. Id. at 466, 485.
106. Id. at 469-70 & n.7.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
108. 456 U.S. at 470 n.7.
109. Every fair employment practices agency in Nebraska makes a reasonable
cause determination during its processing of a charge. See Willborn, supra
note 2, at 234 & n.60.
110. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 258-59.
111. The Nebraska FEPA, the Omaha FEPO, and the Lincoln FEPO provide for an
agency decision after an administrative hearing. See Willborn, supra note 2,
at 238-40. The Grand Island FEPO does not provide for an administrative
hearing and decision. Rather, if there is a reasonable cause determination
and conciliation fails, the ordinance provides for a hearing in state district
court. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-14 (1981).
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
view, 112 even though NEOC decisions made after a hearing do pre-
clude subsequent state review.11 3
State court decisions in employment discrimination cases, how-
ever, may preclude subsequent federal court review. A federal
statute1 4 requires federal courts to give "the same preclusive ef-
fect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given
in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged."" 5
Kremer interpreted this statute to apply with full force in employ-
ment discrimination cases.11 6 As a result, a state court decision
will preclude federal court review if: (1) it would have preclusive
effect in the state courts of the state in which it was issued,"l7 and
(2) the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.11 8
Under the Kremer analysis, some but not all Nebraska state
court decisions in employment discrimination cases will preclude
subsequent federal court review." 9 The procedures in Nebraska
should be sufficient to meet Kremer's "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" standard. To meet the standard, Kremer required only
that a state's procedures satisfy the "minimum procedural require-
ments" of due process.120 The procedures under the Nebraska an-
tidiscrimination statutes compare favorably with the state
procedures discussed in Kremer'2 ' and generally satisfy the mini-
mal Kremer standard. 122
112. 456 U.S. at 470 n.7 (" [U] nreviewed administrative determinations by state
agencies ... should not preclude [federal] review even if such a decision
were to be afforded preclusive effect in a state's own courts.").
113. See Willbom, supra note 2, at 259-66.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
115. 456 U.S. at 466.
116. Kremer rejected the argument that Title VII impliedly repeals § 1738. 456 U.S.
at 468-78. See Note, supra note 101, at 395.
117. 456 U.S. at 466-67.
118. Id. at 480-85. The Court held that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate"
factor is met if the "state proceedings ... do no more than satisfy the mini-
mal procedural requirements of the ... Due Process Clause." Id. at 481.
119. It should be noted that this result cannot be predicted with complete confi-
dence. No Nebraska cases consider the preclusive effect of state or local em-
ployment discrimination decisions. Willborn, supra note 2, at 247.
Consequently, application of the first Kremer factor is particularly uncertain
in Nebraska.
120. 456 U.S. at 481.
121. Compare Willbom, supra note 2, at 229-44 (description of Nebraska proce-
dures) with Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483-84 (description of procedures under the
New York antidiscrimination statute).
122. Procedures under the Omaha and Grand Island ordinances present special
problems under Kremer's "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard. Dis-
crimination complaints may be resolved under both procedures even though
the person alleging discrimination is not a party to the adjudicatory hearing.
See Willbom, supra note 2, at 239, 244, 261-63, 268 n.290. Has the person alleg-
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Not all state court employment discrimination decisions, how-
ever, have preclusive effect in the state courts of Nebraska. Deci-
sions of state courts under the Nebraska FEPA have preclusive
effect in Nebraska, but decisions of state courts under local antidis-
crimination ordinances do not have preclusive effect. 123 Thus,
since federal courts are to give state judgments "the same preclu-
sive effect [they] would be given in the courts of the state from
which the judgments emerged,"' 2 4 state court decisions under the
Nebraska FEPA have preclusive effect in the federal courts, while
state court decisions under local antidiscrimination ordinances do
not have preclusive effect in the federal courts. As a result, a
charging party125 in Nebraska may exhaust a local procedure, in-
cluding the judicial review component of the procedure, and still
obtain a de novo hearing in federal district court. A state court
decision under the state procedure, though, would preclude subse-
quent federal court review.126
The preclusive effect of a federal court decision on subsequent
state court review was not addressed in Kremer.127 As in Kremer,
the law of the system rendering the initial judgment should be ap-
plied.128 Thus, a state court should apply federal law to determine
ing discrimination been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate suffi-
cient to preclude a reconsideration of discrimination issues by a federal court
in a subsequent Title VII suit? The issue need not be resolved, because state
court decisions under local antidiscrimination ordinances do not have preclu-
sive effect in Nebraska cannot meet the first Kremer standard; and, hence, do
not have preclusive effect in federal court. See infra notes 123-26 and accom-
panying text.
123. Willborn, supra note 2, at 266-68.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466.
125. Nonpreclusion favors charging parties. Charging parties can commence Title
VII proceedings; respondents cannot. As a result, if a charging party loses a
local proceeding, a charging party can commence a Title VII proceeding and
nonpreclusion guarantees a fresh start. On the other hand, if a respondent
loses a local proceeding, the respondent cannot commence a Title VII pro-
ceeding, so nonpreclusion is not as helpful.
126. See infra notes 153-255 and accompanying text for a more complete discus-
sion of procedural strategy.
127. Indeed, the author has been unable to locate any employment discrimination
cases on this issue. This absence of cases may result from the Title VII defer-
ral procedures. Title VII requires deferral to a state or local agency and pro-
hibits the federal process from commencing for 60 days after deferral. Title
VII, § 706(c); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). In most cases, then, state proceed-
ings should take place before federal proceedings.
128. In Kremer, this approach was required by statute. See supra notes 115-16 and
accompanying text. Although the source of authority is less certain, the same
approach is required when determining the preclusive effect of federal judg-
ments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982). See 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1% 4468, 4472
(1981) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Degnan, Federalized Res
Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
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the preclusive effect of prior determinations under Title VII.129
Reasonable cause determinations by the EEOC should not pre-
clude subsequent state or local proceedings. Reasonable cause de-
terminations are made after an ex parte investigation by the
EEOC and are by design tentative conclusions;130 the charging
party and respondent are not afforded a "full and fair opportunity
to litigate" before a determination is made by the EEOC;131 and
the reasonable cause determination is not binding,132 and has only
a weak persuasive effect,133 on the federal courts. Federal court
decisions in employment discrimination cases, however, should be
preclusive. Federal court judgments are generally accorded
preclusive effect in state court,134 the charging party and respon-
dent have had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate,"135 and there
is nothing in Title VII which overrides the normal preclusive effect
129. Asserting in state court the preclusive effect of a federal court decision, as
suggested in the text, is the simplest and most direct procedural route. Other
strategies for asserting preclusion, however, are worth consideration. First,
one may be able to obtain the hospitality of a federal court through removal.
See, e.g., Murchison v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
33,038 (S.D. Ga. 1982). This route will not be available, of course, if the plain-
tiff does not raise federal claims in the state court action. Second, the prevail-
ing party in federal court may bring an original action in federal court to
enjoin reconsideration by the state court. See International Controls Corp. v.
Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974); Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474
F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1973); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d
765 (7th Cir. 1958). See generally Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judg-
ment, 42 TENN. L. REv. 635, 656-63 (1975).
130. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.15-1601.18 (1982). See
Willborn, supra note 2, at 434.
131. "Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quali-
ty, extensiveness, or fairness of the procedures followed in the prior litiga-
tion." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979). See also
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461,481 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 111.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
132. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973).
133. See, e.g., Barnes v. Atlantic Steel Co., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1054,
1056-57 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Rubin v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 26 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1519, 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); EEOC v. Chicago Miniature
Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975-76 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Theobald v. Botein,
Hays, Sklar & Herzberg, 465 F. Supp. 609, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
134. State courts have frequently recognized the preclusive effect of federal court
decisions in other contexts. See, e.g., Moran v. Polan, 494 P.2d 814 (Alaska
1972); Martin v. Martin, 2 Cal. 3d 752, 470 P.2d 662, 87 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1970);
Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349 (Del. Ch. 1972); Butler v. Richard
Bertram & Co., 281 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Ham v. Holy Rosary
Hosp., 165 Mont. 369, 529 P.2d 361 (1974); Dube v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 39 A.D.2d 684, 332 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1972); Holmgren v. Westport Tow-
boat Co., 260 Or. 445, 490 P.2d 739 (1971). See generally Vestal, supra note 129,
at 653-55.
135. See supra note 131.
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of federal court judgments. 3 6 If the ordinary requirements for pre-
clusion are present,137 federal court judgments should preclude
subsequent state and federal review.
In Nebraska, then, federal court decisions138 and state court de-
cisions under the Nebraska FEPA139 preclude subsequent state
and federal proceedings. State court decisions under local anti-
discrimination ordinances, however, do not preclude subsequent
state or federal proceedings.14 0 The legal reasons for these results
are clear-statutory law overrides the normal application of pre-
clusion principles for decisions under local ordinances,141 but does
not for decisions under Title VIIm42 or under the Nebraska
FEPA.143
The policy basis is not as clear. If the Nebraska procedures are
viewed in isolation from Title VII, the preclusion rules make sense.
The nonpreclusion of decisions under local ordinances encourages
charging parties to commence proceedings at the lowest adminis-
trative level,144 and yet permits NEOC consideration if the local
disposition has not been satisfactory.145 However, since decisions
under the Nebraska FEPA preclude subsequent Title VII proceed-
ings, the primary effect of the preclusion rules is likely to be whole-
sale avoidance of the Nebraska FEPA procedures.14 6 A charging
party can satisfy the procedural prerequisites to a Title VII suit,
without risking preclusion, by commencing a local proceeding.147
136. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), holds that Title VII
does not override the normal preclusive effect to be accorded state court
judgments. The same should be true a fortiori of federal court judgments.
Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
137. The requirements for preclusion are generally the same in state and federal
courts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 887, Comment a (1982); FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 128, at § 4469. Thus, issue preclusion is available if
there was a final judgment on the merits, the identical issue was decided, the
party against whom preclusion is to be applied was a party to or in practical
control of the prior proceeding, and there was an opportunity to fully and
fairly litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. See Willborn, supra note 2, at
267 & n.280.
138. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. See also Willborn, supra note
2, at 268.
140. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. See also Willborn, supra note
2, at 267-68.
141. Willborn, supra note 2, at 267-68.
142. See supra note 136.
143. Willborn, supra note 2, at 268.
144. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
145. Willborn, supra note 2, at 265-66.
146. Avoidance of state procedures was one of the major fears of the dissenters in
Kremer. 456 U.S. at 504-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note
101, at 404-05.
147. "[N]o [Title VII] charge may be fied [with the EEOC] before the expiration
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Charging parties148 who prefer a federal forum to a state forum, 149
would be likely to commence a proceeding under a local ordinance,
bypass the available state proceeding (and its limiting preclusive
effect), and proceed under Title VII. This result would stunt the
growth and development of antidiscrimination law under the Ne-
braska FEPA150 and would conflict with the goals of multiple fo-
rums in employment discrimination cases. 151 Moreover, this
preclusion scheme is unfortunate because it sets a "trap for the
unwary."152 The unrepresented or poorly represented charging
party is unlikely to understand the complex preclusion scheme
and, hence, is most likely to be prejudiced by it. The Nebraska
Legislature could avoid these unfortunate results by limiting the
preclusive effect of state court decisions under the Nebraska
FEPA.
IV. PROCEDURAL STRATEGY IN NEBRASKA
Charging parties153 have a great deal of freedom when choosing
the forum in which to file their claims. This section will discuss
salient factors in making a forum choice and the procedural tech-
niques for effectuating that choice.
A. Salient Factors in Making a Forum Choice
A charging party in Nebraska has either two or three forums
from which to choose. In areas of Nebraska other than Omaha,
Lincoln and Grand Island, federal and state forums are available.
In Omaha, Lincoln and Grand Island, federal, state and local fo-
rums are available. There are a number of factors that should be
considered and, when in conflict, weighed in making a forum
choice.
of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under... State or lo-
cal law .. " Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (emphasis ad-
ded). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 125.
149. For relevant factors in making a forum choice, see infra notes 154-79 and ac-
companying text.
150. See Note, supra note 101, at 405.
151. If the NEOC were regularly bypassed, an opportunity to conserve federal re-
sources would be lost, local expertise and experience would be squandered,
and the state's ability to experiment, and thereby contribute to the evolution
of antidiscrimination procedures, would be limited. See Willborn, supra note
2, at 252 & n.192.
152. Note, supra note 101, at 405.
153. Charging parties have a distinct advantage over respondents in making fo-
rum choices. Only a charging party can initiate actions. This section, then,
will focus on the choices available to charging parties. The strategies avail-
able to respondents will, of course, be discussed where appropriate.
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Substantive coverage of the respective laws is, of course, an im-
portant consideration. An evaluation of this factor requires a
number of related inquiries. First, substantive coverage refers to
the persons regulated by the employment discrimination laws.
Small employers, for example, may be covered by a local ordi-
nance, but not by the federal or state law.154 Second, substantive
coverage refers to the types of discrimination prohibited. Employ-
ment discrimination because a person receives public assistance,
for example, is prohibited by the Lincoln FEPO, but not by federal
or state law;155 pregnancy discrimination is clearly prohibited by
Title VII, but may not be prohibited by state law.156 Moreover,
some laws provide more direct prohibitions than others. Assume,
for example, that an employer pays a premium wage rate to mar-
ried employees but not to single employees and that 10% of all
married employees are female while 90% of all single employees
are female. A female employee could file sex discrimination
charges under the federal, state and local laws, but the state and
local laws provide a more direct prohibition against marital status
discrimination. The more direct prohibition clarifies the liability
issue and eases proof problems. Third, substantive coverage re-
fers to the theories of discrimination permitted. Respondents may
argue that only disparate treatment, and not disparate impact,157
154. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text; Willborn, supra note 2, at 231 &
nn.41-43.
155. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; Wiliborn, supra note 2, at 230
n.33. There are also more subtle examples. The federal and state prohibi-
tions of age discrimination, for example, only protect persons 40 to 70 years of
age. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a)
(Supp. V 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1003(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982). The Grand
Island FEPO also prohibits age discrimination in employment, but does not
restrict the protected class. GRAND IsLAND, NEB., MUN. CODE § 37-7.1 (1981).
As a result, persons under 40 years of age and over 70 years of age may be
protected by the Grand Island FEPO, but not by federal and state laws.
156. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that pregnancy discrimination
was not prohibited by Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Nebraska Supreme Court had reached
the same result under the Nebraska FEPA. Richards v. Omaha Public
Schools, 194 Neb. 463,232 N.W.2d 29 (1975). Congress subsequently passed an
amendment to Title VII which, in effect, reversed Gilbert by defining Title
VII's sex discrimination prohibition so as to include a ban on pregnancy dis-
crimination. 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980). The
Nebraska legislature has failed to enact a similar proposed amendment to the
Nebraska FEPA. See L.B. 523, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. § 5(10) (1983).
157. "Disparate treatment".., is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorable
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
1983]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
discrimination is cognizable under the Nebraska FEPA.158 Al-
though the argument should be rejected, 5 9 a charging party can
avoid this problem by opting for a federal forum where disparate
impact theory is clearly recognized.
Another salient consideration is the number of "bites at the ap-
ple" available to a charging party. This Article argues that deci-
sions under local ordinances do not preclude subsequent state or
federal review, 60 but that decisions under the Nebraska FEPA16J
and Title VII162 do have preclusive effect. Thus, to maximize her
number of "bites at the apple," a charging party should begin at
the local level and proceed to either a state or federal level.163
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and can-
not be justified by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory
motive.., is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977). See generally FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 12, at §§ 1.3-1.6
(1980); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-15 (1979);
Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment Discrimination, 66
MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1006-08 (1982).
158. Although the argument has been forwarded by respondents' counsel, it has
not been clearly articulated in the case law or literature. See Duffy v. Physi-
cians Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 233, 237-38, 214 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1974); NEBRASKA
ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NEBRASKA HUmiN
RIGHTS AGENCIES 20 (1982); Jackson, Matheson, & Piskorski, The Proper Role
of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MIcH. L. REV.
1485, 1515-16 & n.168 (1981).
159. Those that argue that disparate impact theory is not available under the Ne-
braska FEPA base their arguments upon Duffy v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co.,
191 Neb. 233, 214 N.W.2d 471 (1974) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(3) (1978).
Duffy provides no support for the argument. Disparate impact theory was
inapplicable in Duffy not because the theory was unavailable, but because
the facts in the case did not present a practice or system with a disparate
impact. 191 Neb. at 238, 214 N.W.2d at 474. Thus, Duffy did not reject the
disparate impact theory developed by the federal courts under Title VII;
rather, Duffy was in complete accord with the federal courts. 191 Neb. at 237,
214 N.W.2d at 474 (Nebraska FEPA "was designed to conform to" Title VII).
See Note, Civil Rights-Employment Discrimination-Nebraska Supreme
Court Finds a Need to Prove Intent in Instances of Individual Discrimina-
tion, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 6, 10-14 (1974). Section 48-1119(3) is a remedial
section of the Nebraska FEPA. It provides that the NEOC can provide relief
if it determines the respondent has "intentionally" engaged in illegal discrim-
ination. It parrots language of Title VII, see § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1976), and provides no basis for distinguishing the discrimination theories
available under the Nebraska FEPA from those available under Title VII.
160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
163. The conclusions of this Article on preclusion issues were reached despite a
dearth of court opinions on the issues. A litigant, then, should re-evaluate the
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The procedural frameworks of the respective systems are an
additional consideration when choosing a forum. The federal and
state systems, for example, provide divergent rules for class ac-
tions.1 6 4 Under Title VII, class actions are very common and many
of the procedural issues have been resolved.165 In Nebraska, class
actions are quite rare 166 and even major issues remain unad-
dressed.167 Thus, a charging party contemplating a class action
should opt for a federal forum.168 Similarly, the charging party
should anticipate discovery and evidentiary problems and evalu-
ate them under the procedural frameworks available, and the
charging party's counsel should evaluate her competency to oper-
ate within the respective procedural frameworks.
Charging parties should also evaluate the quality and propensi-
ties of the primary decision maker in making forum choices.
Under the Omaha FEPO, the Omaha Commission is the primary
decision maker; state courts have only limited review powers.169
Under the Lincoln FEPO and the Nebraska FEPA, state courts are
conclusions as the law develops. Moreover, a litigant should recognize that
the courts may disagree with the conclusions of this Article on preclusion
issues.
164. Private Title VII class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); East Tex. Mo-
tor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). Class actions in the
Nebraska courts are governed by NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (1979).
165. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 does
not apply to EEOC class actions); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodri-
quez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 applies to private Title VII class
action); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (backpay may be
awarded to unnamed class members even though they have not exhausted
Title VII's administrative procedures); Dickerson v. United States Steel
Corp., 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978) (res judicata does not bar unnamed class
members from pursuing claims that were not actually litigated in the class
suit); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975) (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b) (2) certification is appropriate for Title VII class actions). See gener-
ally FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 12, at §§ 6.1-6.9; LARSON, supra note
12, at §§ 49.50-.56.
166. "In only one [Nebraska] case has the [Nebraska Supreme C]ourt allowed
damages to be recovered by a class, and in that case the class action issue
was not contested." Robinson & Dahlk, Class Actions-The Nebraska Proce-
dure, 61 NEB. L. REV. 30, 52 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
167. No cases have addressed the relationship between the NEOC administrative
process and the Nebraska class action statute. Thus, basic issues-for exam-
ple, whether persons can be included in a class as unnamed class members if
they have not exhausted the procedural prerequisites to suit-are
unanswered.
168. "[A] plaintiff desiring to pursue [any type of] class action in Nebraska
should fie in federal court whenever possible because it is virtually impossi-
ble to maintain such an action in state court." Robinson & Dahlke, supra note
167, at 52.
169. Willborn, supra note 2, at 239, 243.
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the primary decision makers; administrative bodies develop the
record and make an initial determination, 7 0 but the scope of judi-
cial review is very broad.'7' Under Title VII, the federal courts are
the primary decision makers. 7 2 Although evaluation of these deci-
sion makers depends heavily on "lawyer's lore" and may vary from
year-to-year, charging parties often prefer a federal judge as the
primary decision maker. 7 3
Finally, a charging party making a forum choice should con-
sider cost and recovery factors. The charging party should evalu-
ate prosecution costs. Under the Omaha 7 4 and Grand Island 7 5
fair employment practices ordinances, the city prosecutes the ac-
tion on behalf of the charging party. That should reduce prosecu-
tion expenses and, hence, tends to favor the local forum. The
charging party should also estimate the time necessary to resolve a
charge. The backlog of the various enforcement agencies may vary
considerably, as may the backlog of the respective courts. Differ-
ences in the available relief may also be important. Recovery of
attorney fees, for instance, is more restricted under the Nebraska
FEPA than it is under Title VII.176
It is unlikely that all of these factors will point to the same fo-
rum. A charging party may, at the same time, be attracted to a
federal forum because of the class action advantages 7 7 and to a
170. Id. at 238-40.
171. Id. at 240-43.
172. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
173. See Note, supra note 101. Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461,
505 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (charging parties may abandon state
procedures to pursue Title VII remedies in federal court); Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (civil rights litigators prefer fed-
eral to state forums because federal judges are more competent, have a psy-
chological set that is more favorable to plaintiffs, and are better insulated
from majoritarian processes). But see Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Be-
tween the State and Federal Courts for Private Remedies Under Federal Se-
curities Laws, 60 N.C.L. REV. 707, 731-33 (1982); Fischer, Institutional
Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum
Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 175 (1980).
174. Willborn, supra note 2, at 239.
175. Id. at 244.
176. Parties prevailing under Title VII may recover for services performed at
every stage of the litigation. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,
447 U.S. 54 (1980) (proceedings before a state administrative agency); Morrow
v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978) (proceedings on appeal); Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978) (hearing to determine propriety
and amount of fee award). Parties prevailing under the Nebraska FEPA may
recover attorney fees only if appeal is made to the district court and, perhaps,
only for services performed in the district court. Wiilborn, supra note 2, at
242 & n.122.
177. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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local forum to maximize her "bites at the apple."' 7 8 There is, of
course, no talismanic formula for determining the best forum. The
determination can only be made by weighing factors, such as those
listed above. 7 9
B. Procedural Techniques
Once a forum choice is made, a charging party must consider
procedural techniques for effectuating that choice. If the choice is
between a state and local forum, there are no problems. As a prac-
tical matter, in Nebraska, the place of filing will determine the
agency that initially processes a charge.180 If the choice, however,
is between a state or local forum, on the one hand, and a federal
forum, on the other hand, the procedural techniques are not as
simple.
1. Securing a Federal Forum
Assume that a decision is made by a charging party that a fed-
eral forum is preferable to a state or local forum. Title VII proce-
dure requires a state or local filing as a prerequisite to a federal
filing.181 The problem, then, is one of opting out of the state or lo-
cal procedure without prejudicing the Title VII cause of action. 82
There are two techniques for opting out of state or local proce-
dures that preserve the Title VII cause of action but sacrifice any
state or local claims.183 First, a charging party can opt out by with-
drawing the state or local charge. Title VII does not require as a
178. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
179. This section does not attempt to exhaustively list the factors that should be
considered in making a forum choice; rather, important factors are listed and,
beyond that, trust is placed in the judgment of the Nebraska bar.
180. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 245-46.
181. Title VI, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See supra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
182. Although this Article argues that a Nebraska state court decision under a lo-
cal law should not preclude subsequent federal consideration, there is a risk
that the federal claim would be precluded. See supra note 119. The "opting
out" strategies discussed in this section enable a charging party to avoid that
risk.
183. The sacrifice of state or local claims may be meaningless. A federal adjudica-
tion, which is presumptively preferable, would preclude a subsequent state
or local adjudication. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text. Thus,
nothing is gained by attempting to preserve state or local claims until after a
federal adjudication unless the state or local law provides an attack that is
not available under federal law. If the claim, for example, is solely a sex dis-
crimination claim, the sacrifice of state and local avenues of redress is rela-
tively meaningless. However, if the claim could be framed as either sex or
marital status discrimination, the sacrifice of state and local avenues of re-
dress would be significant if the sex discrimination claim fails in federal
court.
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prerequisite to a federal action that state or local procedures be
exhausted; it only requires that state or local procedures be "com-
menced."184 Thus, the technique of filing and then withdrawing185
a state or local charge satisfies the prerequisite to a filing under
Title VII while avoiding a state or local adjudication of the claim
which may prejudice the federal action. Second, the charging
party can, in effect, opt out by seeking186 an administrative deter-
mination of "no reasonable cause" from the state or local agency.
A respondent would not have standing to obtain review of such a
determination, 8 7 so the state or local proceeding would conclude
at that point, and a state or local finding of "no reasonable cause"
would not prejudice a subsequent Title VII proceeding.188
184. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
596 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1979); Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 7-8 (7th
Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1976); Grubbs v.
Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Harris v. Ericson, 457 F.2d 765, 766-
67 (10th Cir. 1972); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298,
1305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). See also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 756, 759 (1979); Curto v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 31 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 1 33,366 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But see Jordan v. United States, 522 F.2d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 1975); Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973, 975-75 (10th
Cir. 1973); Schudtze v. Dean Witter & Co., 418 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
185. Title VII provides state and local agencies with exclusive jurisdiction of dis-
crimination charges for a period of 60 days. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (1976). It is therefore advisable to withdraw the state or local
charge more than 60 days after the initial filing. Such a delayed withdrawal
avoids claims that the "exclusive jurisdiction" policy of Title VII has been
undermined, but see supra note 184 and accompanying text, but allows the
withdrawal to occur before the federal claim has been prejudiced.
186. Agreeing to a stipulation of no reasonable cause is one way of doing this.
There are two problems with that route. First, the respondent may not enter
into the stipulation if it prefers a state or local forum. Second, the state or
local commission may refuse to accept a stipulation of "no reasonable cause."
The NEOC has refused to accept stipulations of "reasonable cause" desired
by respondents (presumably to avoid an NEOC investigation) because of its
statutory duty to investigate charges. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1982). The charging party may also seek a determination of "no reason-
able cause" by failing to cooperate fully in the investigation.
187. Indeed, the statute does not explicitly provide for review of reasonable cause
determinations even if the party seeking review has standing. But see
Willborn, supra note 2, at 234-36 (judicial review of adverse reasonable cause
determinations should be available).
188. That is, a federal court would not be precluded by the state or local "no rea-
sonable cause" determination. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461, 470 n.7 (1982). See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. The state
or local "no reasonable cause' determination may be admissible as evidence
in the federal court proceeding, compare, e.g., King v. Georgia Power Co., 295
F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968) with Pantchenko v. C.B. Dodge Co., 18 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 686 (D. Conn. 1977), but it is unlikely to be overly persua-
sive. See Spray v. Kellos-Sims Crane Rental, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Ga.
1981).
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There is another technique for opting out of state or local proce-
dures which entails a greater risk of prejudice to the Title VII pro-
ceeding, but which has the advantage of preserving state or local
claims. The charging party can seek a continuance in state court189
until the federal court has had an opportunity to hear the Title VII
cause of action. If successful, this would preserve any unique state
or local claims.190 State courts, however, have a great deal of dis-
cretion in granting or denying continuances'91 and they are not
likely to be overly receptive to this type of continuance request.192
If the motion for a continuance is denied, a state court decision
may preclude any subsequent consideration by a federal court. 93
Respondents desiring a federal forum have another procedural
option. They may be able to remove a state action to federal
court. 94 Removal is permitted, however, only if the federal court
would have original jurisdiction.195 A charging party, then, can
avoid removal by raising only state claims in state court and re-
serving federal claims for a subsequently filed federal action. 9 6
2. Securing a State or Local Forum
A party may decide that a state or local forum is preferable to a
federal forum. None of the state or local procedures require a
filing with the EEOC before the state or local charge can be
processed. 97 As a result, the problem is not one of opting out of a
procedure that must be begun.19 8 Rather, the problem is one of
189. The charging party may also, with less risk to the federal cause of action, seek
a continuance earlier in the state or local proceeding. For example, the
charging party can request a delay in the reasonable cause determination or
in the administrative hearing. If such a continuance request is denied (the
NEOC, for example, generally denies continuance requests), the charging
party still has the option of withdrawing her charge to ensure nonprejudice to
her federal cause of action.
190. State or local claims which are not unique, however, would be precluded by a
federal court decision. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
191. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1148 (1979). See Vlcek v. Sutton, 201 Neb. 555,270 N.W.2d
906 (1978); Veik v. Tilden Bank, 200 Neb. 705, 265 N.W.2d 214 (1978); Jordan v.
Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968).
192. Cf. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
193. See supra note 182.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). See Salem v. La Salle High School, 31 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) T 33,527 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Murchison v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.,
30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,038 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
195. "[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed ... " 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
196. See Vestal, supra note 129, at 656-58. Cf. Thorson v. City of Omaha, 445 F.
Supp. 268, 269 (D. Neb. 1978).
197. Cf. Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
198. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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delaying the Title VII cause of action until the state or local claim
has been resolved.
There are two primary methods of delaying the Title VII cause
of action. First, the charging party can simply fail to file charges
with the EEOC. This guarantees noninterference with the state or
local cause of action, but sacrifices the Title VII cause of action.19 9
Second, the charging party can fie a charge with the EEOC,200
while actively pursuing the state or local charges.20 1 The EEOC
processing of the Title VII charge does not influence the state or
local proceeding.20 2 As a result, if the state or local proceedings are
completed before the EEOC completes its consideration of the Ti-
tle VII charge, a charging party can have her claim heard in a state
or local forum while preserving any residual Title VII rights. If,
however, the state or local proceedings are still in process when
the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the charging party must
either sacrifice her Title VII claim by allowing the time limit for
filing a lawsuit to expire,203 or fie a Title VII lawsuit and risk inter-
ference with the state or local proceedings. 20 4
3. "Two Bites in One"
An alternative to sequential state or local and federal hearings
is to have claims under different laws heard by one forum. Thus, a
state or federal court may hear both state and federal claims si-
199. The Title VII cause of action will be lost if the EEOC filing is not made within
300 days of the alleged illegal act. Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(e)
(1976). See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
200. Since the goal is to delay the Title VII proceeding until the state or local pro-
ceedings have been completed, a charging party should file the state or local
charges as soon as possible and the Title VII charge as late as possible. This
strategy could give the state or local proceedings a 300-day headstart before
the EEOC even begins to consider the charge. See supra notes 30-37 and ac-
companying text.
201. A charging party is likely to be more interested in preserving her Title VII
cause of action if she decides to initially pursue the local, rather than the
state, remedy. Determinations under a local ordinance would not have
preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII proceeding, while determinations
under state statute would have preclusive effect. See supra notes 139-43 and
accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
203. The advantage of this route is that it, once again, guarantees noninterference
with the state or local proceedings.
204. The interference would be most direct if the federal action concluded before
the state or local action. See supra notes 134-37 accompanying text. In addi-
tion, interference could result if respondents attempted to remove the state
or local action and consolidate it with the federal action. A charging party
could attempt to avoid interference by moving for a stay of the federal action
until completion of the previously-instituted state or local proceedings. But
see Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
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multaneously. This may be the optimum solution for some charg-
ing parties. A charging party with class-wide claims of sex and
marital status discrimination, for example, may prefer the state or
local laws substantively20 5 and Title VII procedurally.2 06 Attempts
to raise state and federal claims simultaneously raise issues of ju-
risdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
a. Raising Title VII Claims in State Court
One option for the innovative charging party is to have Title VII
claims heard in state court along with state or local claims.20 7 A
charging party, for instance, may want to ensure the availability of
disparate impact theory,208 while operating in a procedural frame-
work more familiar to counsel.20 9 This option raises two primary
issues: (1) Do state courts have jurisdiction of Title VII claims?
and (2) can charging parties satisfy the procedural prerequisites to
a Title VII action?
State courts should have jurisdiction over Title VII claims.210
State courts of general jurisdiction generally have the power to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over cases arising under the laws of the United
States, unless the power is expressly denied by Congress:
[R] ights acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted
in the United States Courts or in the State Courts... subject, however, to
this qualification, that where a right arises under a law of the United
205. See supra text at notes 156-57.
206. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
207. It is difficult to consolidate state and local claims in a single proceeding. See
Willborn, supra note 2, at 257 & n.216. As a result, the charging party will have
to decide whether to consolidate her state or her local claim with her Title VII
claim.
208. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
210. The Supreme Court has specifically reserved consideration of this issue,
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1983), and the lower
courts are split, compare, e.g., Salem v. La Salle High School, 31 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 1 33,527 (D.C. Cal. 1983) and Greene v. County School Board of
Henrico County, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,761 (E.D. Va. 1981) (state
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims) with
Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8984 (E.D. Mich.
1978), or undecided. See Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 719 n.7 (6th Cir.
1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1084 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1980).
It should be noted that state court jurisdiction over Title VII claims may
increase the preclusive effect of state court decisions. Since claim preclusion
applies to claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding, see
Willborn, supra note 2, at 246-47, permitting charging parties to raise Title VII
claims in state court may result in claim preclusion applying to all Title VII
claims of a charging party who pursues an action in state court, whether or
not the claims were actually raised in state court. See Willborn, supra note 2,
at 256-57.
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States, Congress may, if it sees fit, give to the Federal Courts exclusive
jurisdiction.2 1 1
Congress has not expressly denied state court jurisdiction of Ti-
tle VII claims. Title VI's private enforcement scheme permits a
charging party to bring "a civil action.., against the respondent
named in the charge." 212 The Act specifically grants jurisdiction to
federal district courts, 213 but it does not limit the rights of a charg-
ing party to file suit elsewhere.2 14 In contrast, Title VII authorizes
the Attorney General in public enforcement actions 215 to fie only
in "the appropriate United States district court."216 Statements in
the Congressional Record relating to private enforcement in the
federal courts2 17 and sections of Title VII referring to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and federal statutes applicable only in
federal court,2 18 indicate only that Congress saw the federal courts
as the primary enforcers of Title VII rights. The statements and
sections are not an express denial of state court jurisdiction. This
result-that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title
VII claims-aligns enforcement of Title VII with enforcement of
other federal civil rights statutes on this issue.2 19
211. Chaflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876). This general rule, although
ancient, see Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-27 (1820), continues to
maintain its vitality. See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962).
212. Title VII, § 706(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
213. Title VII, § 706(f) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (1976).
214. See Salem v. La Salle High School, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,527 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Greene v. County School Bd. of Henrico County, 29 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 32,761 (E.D. Va. 1981); Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 21
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,483 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Bennun v. Bd. of Gover-
nors of Rutgers, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (D.N.J. 1976). But see Dickinson v.
Chrysler Corp., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8984 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Fox v.
Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 237-38, 358 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1976); Lucas v.
Tanner Bros. Contracting Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104 (Ariz.
Sup. Ct. 1974).
215. See supra note 8.
216. Title VII, § 706(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
217. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum of Senate
floor managers Clark and Case); 110 Cong. Rec. 7243 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Case); 110 Cong. Rec. 12708, 12722 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
218. Title VII, § 706(f) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2) (1976) (injunctive relief "shall
be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure"); Title VII, §706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) (28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404, 1406 govern venue); Title VII, § 706(f) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (4)
(1976) (Chief Judge of District Court shall designate District Judge to hear
and determine the case); Title VII, § 706(f) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (5) (1976)
(a master can be appointed "pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure"); Title VII, § 706(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (1976) (appeals subject
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292); Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1976) (At-
torney General may request a three-judge court).
219. Salem v. La Salle High School, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,527 (C.D. Cal.
1983); Bennun v. Bd. of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (D.
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Charging parties should be able to satisfy the procedural pre-
requisites to a Title VII action. The only procedural prerequisites
are: (1) the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC, and (2) the
timely filing of a court action upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter.220
Since the EEOC will issue a right-to-sue letter upon request any
time after 180 days from the filing of a charge of discrimination,221
the charging party should be able to coordinate matters so that re-
ceipt of the right-to-sue letter will coincide with the time for filing
an action in state court.
Thus, charging parties should be able to raise Title VII claims in
state court. The state courts have jurisdiction of Title VII claims
and charging parties should be able to fulfill the procedural prereq-
uisites to suit.222
b. Raising State or Local Claims in Federal Court
A charging party may also attempt to get "two bites in one" by
combining state or local claims with Title VII claims in federal
court. This would allow charging parties to benefit from the sub-
stantive advantages of state or local law223 while maintaining the
procedural advantages of the federal forum.224 Once again, issues
of jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
raised.
Charging parties have had varying success in attempting to ap-
pend state or local claims to Title VII claims under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine.2 25 A federal court has discretion 226 to exer-
N.J. 1976). See also Tomsick v. Jones, 464 F. Supp. 371, 373-74 (D. Colo. 1979);
DiAntonio v. Pennsylvania State Univ. 455 F. Supp. 510, 512 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
220. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
221. EEOC Procedural Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1) (1982). See also id. at
§ 1601.28 (a) (2) (1982) (EEOC may issue right-to-sue letter upon request prior
to expiration of 180 days from filing of charge if EEOC administrative
processes cannot be completed promptly).
222. State or local claims in Nebraska are generally heard on the record developed
before an administrative hearing officer or agency. See Willborn, supra note
2, at 240-43. Title VII claims, on the other hand, are subject to a trial de novo
in court. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Consequently, in a
case in which claims have been combined, the charging party should have an
opportunity to present evidence on her Title VII claim.
223. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 230; see supra note 205 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
225. Compare, e.g., cases holding that there is pendent jurisdiction over state or
local fair employment practices claims in a Title VII action: Montano v. Am-
star Corp., 502 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Anandam v. Ft. Wayne Com-
munity Schools, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 773, 776 (N.D. Ind. 1978);
Pittman v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 870,
872 (E.D. Mich. 1978), with cases holding that there is not pendent jurisdic-
tion in such cases: Wilkins v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac.
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cise pendent jurisdiction over state or local claims if: (1) the
claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, ' 227 and
(2) Congress has not expressly or impliedly negated the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction.228
In employment discrimination cases, the state or local and fed-
eral claims generally arise from a common nucleus of facts.229
Some courts, however, have refused to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion over state or local claims because, in their view, Congress in
enacting Title VII impliedly negated the exercise of pendent juris-
diction by limiting the available relief and by imposing certain pro-
cedural limitations. In Jong-Yul Lim v. International Institute of
Metropolitan Detroit, Inc.,230 for example, the court noted that
Congress restricted Title VII plaintiffs to equitable relief only.23 1
Thus, in the court's opinion, pendent jurisdiction of claims under
state or local laws providing broader relief was precluded.2 32 Even
if this rationale were completely persuasive, which it is not,233 it
Cas. (BNA) 154, 154-55 (D. Kan. 1980); Gerlach v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 448 F.
Supp. 1168, 1173-74 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Morgan v. Sharon Pa. Bd. of Educ., 445
F. Supp. 142, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp.
1215, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Brown v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1055, 1059 (D. Kan. 1976). See generally SCHLEI, supra note 12, at 741-
43. For a recent and complete analysis, see Catania, State Employment Dis-
crimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction under Title VII: Access to
Federal Courts, 32 AMER. U.L. REV: 777, 788-838 (1983).
226. "[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs right."
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
227. Id. at 725.
228. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1976). See Catania, supra note 225, at 788-92.
229. Title VII and the state and local fair employment practices laws in Nebraska
are very similar. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 227 n.11. State and local
claims under fair employment practices laws and Title VII claims generally
arise from a common nucleus of facts. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 473-74 (1982); Montano v. Amstar Corp., 502 F. Supp. 295,
297 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Anandam v. Ft. Wayne Community Schools, 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 773, 776 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Gerlach v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 448
F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Compare Gerlach, 448 F. Supp. at 1173
(no common nucleus of facts between federal Title VII and Equal Pay Act
claims and state tort and Civil Rights Act claims); Ferguson v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 443 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no common nucleus of facts
between Title VII claim and state "blacklisting" claim). See Catania, supra
note 225, at 793.
230. 510 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
231. Id. at 725.
232. Id. See also Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F. Supp. 115,
118 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Kiss v. Tamaric Utils., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 951, 954 (S.D. Fla.
1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977);
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1973). But see
Palazon v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 458,
460 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
233. See Catania, supra note 225, at 795-805.
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would not undermine pendent jurisdiction of claims based on the
Nebraska FEPA. The Nebraska FEPA also provides for equitable
relief only,234 so appending the claims to a Title VII claim would
not conflict with any Congressional desire to restrict available re-
lief under Title VII. Similarly, the court in Jong-Yul Linn found an
implied negation of pendent jurisdiction in certain procedural limi-
tations of Title VII, specifically, in the denial of a right to a jury
tria 235 and in the provisions providing for the appointment of a
master.23 6 Once again, even if persuasive,237 these procedural limi-
tations indicate an intent to negate pendent jurisdiction only to the
extent that Title VII's procedural provisions conflict with a state or
local law's procedural provisions. Thus, the denial of a right to a
jury trial would not negate pendent jurisdiction of claims under
the Nebraska FEPA which, like Title VII, provides for equitable
relief only and does not extend a right to a jury trial.238
Some federal courts have declined to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion over state or local employment discrimination claims, not be-
cause of a lack of constitutional or statutory power, but in the
exercise of their discretion.23 9 In exercising this discretion, courts
should make the determination based upon "considerations of ju-
dicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" and should
avoid needless decisions of state law.2 40 Thus, the argument
agenda is established, and it is entirely appropriate for courts with
the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction to do so in some
cases, 241 but not in others.242
234. The remedial provision of the Nebraska FEPA is based upon, and is very sim-
ilar to, the remedial provision of Title VII. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1119(3) (1978) with Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g) (1976).
The Omaha FEPO and Lincoln FEPO provide for legal, as well as equita-
ble, relief. OMAHA CIviL RiGHTS HEARING BD. RULES, ch. 5, rule 7-3 (1981);
LINCOLN, NEB., COMM1'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE AND REGS. FOR CONDUCTING
PUB. HEARINGS, rule 9-2 (1982). The Grand Island FEPO is silent on the relief
available. Thus, if this Jong-Yul Lim rationale is accepted, pendent jurisdic-
tion over some local claims in Nebraska may be precluded.
235. Jong-Yul Lim, 510 F. Supp. at 725.
236. Id. at 725-26. See also Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F.
Supp. 115, 118 (M.D. Fla. 1982). But see Palazon v. KFC Nat'l Management
Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 458, 461 (N.D. I. 1981).
237. But see Catania, supra note 225, at 806-08.
238. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 238-42.
239. See infra note 242.
240. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). See Catania, supra
note 225, at 808-16.
241. Meyer v. C & H Sugar Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1175, 1177-78 (9th
Cir. 1981); Palazon v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 458, 460-61 (N.D. Mll. 1981); Goodman v. Board of Trustees, 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1762, 1763-64 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Montano v. Amstar
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 295,297 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 476
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If a federal court exercises pendent jurisdiction over a state or
local claim, it must still address the issue of exhaustion of state or
local administrative remedies. The issue may arise in one of two
ways. First, the charging party may have completed the proce-
dural prerequisites to court action, but filed the action in federal
rather than state court. Second, the charging party may have filed
the action in federal court without completing the state or local
procedural prerequisites to suit.
As an example of the former, a charging party may pursue a
claim under the Nebraska FEPA until the NEOC issues an opin-
ion.24 3 Then, instead of appealing the decision to state district
court,244 the charging party fies a Title VII action in federal court
with the state claim appended. The "appeal" to federal court
should be permissible even though the Nebraska FEPA grants the
state district courts exclusive jurisdiction of such appeals; 245 state
attempts to limit the power of a federal court to assert pendent
jurisdiction are invalid.2 46 Charging parties have the ability to pur-
sue this strategy because of their ability to time the receipt of fed-
eral right-to-sue letters.247 The strategy is attractive because it
largely avoids the exhaustion issue;248 simply stated, the charging
party has exhausted the state's procedural prerequisites to court
action. Ironically, the danger of the strategy for charging parties is
that they may succeed before the NEOC. If that happens, respon-
dents may appeal to state district court.249 Thus, there may be two
"appeals," one in state and one in federal court.25o Comity inter-
F. Supp. 335, 336-37 n.3 (D.N.J. 1979); Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75
F.R.D. 499, 505-06 (D. Del. 1977).
242. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 572, 576-77
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Hughes v. Marsh Instrument Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 702, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Wilkins v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 154, 154-55 (D. Kan. 1980); Douglas v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298, 304-06 (D. Conn. 1979); Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
458 F. Supp. 505, 518-19 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. &Tel.
Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1978); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444
F. Supp. 1215, 1220-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Looney v. Commerical Union Assur-
ance Cos. 428 F. Supp. 533, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Holden v. H.J. Heinz Co., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 178 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
243. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 238-39. Similarly, a charging party may pursue
a claim under the Omaha FEPO or Lincoln FEPO until the local commission
issues an opinion. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 239-40.
244. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 240-43. But see infra note 251.
245. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(3) (b) (4) (1978). See also OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE,
§ 13-199 (1980); LINcoLN, NEB., MUN. CODE § 11.02.070(i) (1980).
246. See Catania, supra note 225, at 820-21 & n.202.
247. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
249. See Willborn, supra note 2, at 240-43.
250. If a charging party is totally successful before the NEOC, she has no right to
appeal the NEOC decision, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1120(1) (1978) (only "ag-
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ests may result in a deferral by the federal court in such a
situation.25 '
Alternatively, a charging party may file a Title VII action in fed-
eral court, with a pendent state or local claim, without completing
the state or local procedural prerequisites to suit. Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkin.S252 requires a federal court hearing a state claim to
"apply state substantive law and federal procedural law."2 53 A
charging party's argument, then, is that the state or local prerequi-
sites to suit are procedural,254 and consequently, that a federal
court need not dismiss the suit for failure to satisfy the
prerequisites. 2 55
In sum, attempts to append state or local claims to a Title VII
claim in federal court open up new and largely unexplored path-
ways in the labyrinth. Both major issues raised by the tactic-ju-
risdiction and exhaustion of remedies-are subject to uncertainty.
Charging parties contemplating this strategy must weigh the po-
tential advantages against the uncertainty.
V. CONCLUSION
The procedural labyrinth discussed by this Article is particu-
larly treacherous. Every turn down a new tunnel, it seems, dis-
closes a number of new paths. And many of these paths have
never been explored. This Article provides some guidance through
the labyrinth and alerts Nebraska practitioners to paths that merit
exploration.
grieved" parties may appeal), and the argument that the "appeal" to federal
court is merely a part of the Nebraska procedure is weakened. See also
OMAHA, NEB., MUN. CODE § 13-199 (1980).
251. See Goodman v. Board of Trustees, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1762, 1764
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
252. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
253. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
254. The distinction between procedure and substance, despite its importance, is
particularly ill-defined. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 693, 724 (1974) ("[w]e were all brought up on sophisticated talk about
the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure"); Risinger, "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitu-
tional Problems of "Irrebutable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 202
(1982) ("organized confusion is the official doctrine"). For a discussion of the
proper classification of state or local prerequisites to suit, see Catania, supra
note 225, at 826-32.
255. But see Dadas v. Prescott, Ball & Torben, 529 F. Supp. 203, 205-06 (N.D. Ohio
1981); Manuel v. International Harvester Co., 502 F. Supp. 45, 48-49 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
1983]
